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Abstract
When aggregating preferences of agents via voting, two desirable goals are to
identify outcomes that are Pareto optimal and to incentivize agents to partici-
pate in the voting process. We consider participation notions as formalized by
Brandl, Brandt, and Hofbauer (2015) and study how far efficiency and partici-
pation are achievable by randomized social choice functions in particular when
agents’ preferences are downward lexicographic (DL) or satisfy stochastic dom-
inance (SD). Our results include the followings ones: we prove formal relations
between the participation notions with respect to SD and DL and we show that
the maximal recursive rule satisfies very strong participation with respect to
both SD and DL.
Keywords: Social choice theory, Social decision function, stochastic
dominance, participation, efficiency, strategyproofness.
1. Introduction
Two fundamental goals in collective decision making are (1) agents should
be incentivized to participate and (2) the outcome should be such that there
exists no other outcome that each agent prefers. We consider these goals of
participation [14, 16] and efficiency [4, 17] in the context of randomized so-
cial choice. In randomized social choice, we study randomized social choice
functions (referred to as social decision schemes (SDSs) which take as input
agents’ preferences over alternatives and return a probability distribution over
the alternatives. The probability distribution can also represent time-sharing
arrangements or relative importance of alternatives [2, 10]. For example, agents
may vote on the proportion of time different genres of songs are played on a ra-
dio channel. This type of preference aggregation is not captured by traditional
deterministic voting in which the output is a single discrete alternative which
may not be suitable to cater for different tastes.
When defining notions such as participation, efficiency, and strategyproof-
ness, one needs to reason about preferences over probability distributions (lot-
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teries). In order to define these properties, we consider the stochastic dominance
(SD) and downward lexicographic (DL) lottery extensions to extend preferences
over alternatives to preferences over lotteries. A lottery is preferred over an-
other lottery with respect to SD , if for all utility functions consistent with the
ordinal preferences, the former yields as much utility as the latter. DL is a nat-
ural lexicographical refinement of SD . Lexicographic preferences have received
considerable attention within randomized social choice [1, 2, 7, 13, 19, 20].
Although efficiency and strategyproofness with respect to SD and DL have
been considered in a series of papers [2, 7, 6, 3, 10, 13, 15, 18], three notions of
participation with respect to SD were formalized only recently by Brandl et al.
[11]. The three notions include very strong (participating is strictly beneficial),
strong (participating is at least as helpful as not participating) and standard (not
participating is not more beneficial). In contrast to deterministic social choice
in which the number of possible outcome is at most the number of alternatives,
randomized social choice admits infinite outcomes which makes participation
even more meaningful: an agent may be able to perturb the outcome of the
lottery slightly in his favour by participating in the voting process. In spirit of
the radio channel example, voters should ideally be able to increase the fractional
time of their favorite music genres by participating in the vote to decide the
durations.
Participation is closely related to strategyproofness which requires that mis-
reporting preferences is not beneficial. If agents are truthful but may consider
not participating in voting, then the issue of participation assumes more im-
portance than the issue of untruthful voting [11]. Note that for almost all
reasonable social choice functions, participating but expressing complete indif-
ference between all alternatives is equivalent to not participating at all. The
two central results presented by Brandl et al. [11] were: (1) there exists a social
decision scheme (RSD) that satisfies very strong SD -participation and ex post
efficiency (Theorem 4, [11]); (2) There exists a social decision scheme (uniform
randomization over the Borda winners) that satisfies strong SD-participation
and SD-efficiency (Theorem 7, [11]).
Using the work by Brandl et al. [11] as a starting point, we expand the
discussion on participation in randomized social choice by considering partic-
ipation with respect to the lexicographic lottery extension and exploring the
relationship between the participation notions with respect to the two exten-
sions. We also consider social decision schemes that were not considered by
Brandl et al. [11]) including the maximal recursive rule (MR) [2];egalitarian
simultaneous reservation (ESR) [7]; and serial dictatorship. We consider the
extent to which participation can be achieved by SDSs.
Contributions. Our contributions include relations among participation notions
(see Figure 2) as well as understanding the relative merits of SDSs in terms of
efficiency and participation (see Table 1).
• We relate participation concepts with respect to DL and SD (see Fig-
ure 2). Although very strong SD-participation implies very strong DL-
participation, DL-participation implies SD-participation. Moreover a
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RSD SML BO MR ESR
Properties
DL-efficient – – – – +
SD-efficient – + + – +
ex post efficient + + + + +
Very strong SD -participation + – – + –
Very strong DL-participation + – – + –
Strong SD-participation + – + + –
Table 1: A comparison of axiomatic properties of different social decision schemes: RSD (ran-
dom serial dictatorship), SML (strict maximal lotteries), BO (uniform randomization over
Borda winners), MR (maximal recursive rule), and ESR (egalitarian simultaneous reserva-
tion). The circled results are from this paper. All the schemes are anonymous and neutral.
combination of strong SD-participation and DL-participation implies very
strong SD-participation.
• We show that the Maximal Recursive (MR) rule [2] satisfies very strong
SD-participation hence being the first known SDS to date to satisfy the
property and also be polynomial-time computable. Previously, RSD was
proved to satisfy very strong SD-participation [11] but RSD probabilities
are #P-complete to compute [5].
• We point that ESR [7] does not satisfy strong SD-participation.
• We highlight that although random serial dictatorship satisfies very strong
SD-participation and hence very strong DL-participation, serial dictator-
ship does not even satisfy very strong DL-participation. It follows that if
a rule satisfies DL-strategyproofness, it need not satisfy very strong DL-
participation. Similarly, if a rule satisfies SD -strategyproofness, it need
not satisfy very strong SD-participation.
2. Related Work
One of the first formal works on randomized social choice is by Gibbard [15].
The literature in randomized social choice has grown over the years although
it is much less developed in comparison to deterministic social choice. The
main result of Gibbard [15] was that random dictatorship in which each agent
has uniform probability of choosing his most preferred alternative is the unique
anonymous, strategyproof and ex post efficient SDS. Random serial dictatorship
(RSD) is the natural generalization of random dictatorship for weak preferences
but the RSD lottery is #P-complete to compute [5].
Bogomolnaia and Moulin [9] initiated the use of stochastic dominance to
consider various notions of strategyproofness, efficiency, and fairness conditions
in the domain of random assignments which is a special type of social choice
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setting. They proposed the probabilistic serial mechanism — a desirable ran-
dom assignment mechanism. Cho [13] extended the approach of Bogomolnaia
and Moulin [9] by considering other lottery extensions such as ones based on
lexicographic preferences.
The tradeoff of efficiency and strategyproofness for SDSs was formally con-
sidered in a series of papers [2, 7, 6, 3, 10]. Aziz and Stursberg [7] presented a
generalization — Egalitarian Simultaneous Reservation (ESR) — of the prob-
abilistic serial mechanism to the domain of social choice. Aziz [2] proposed the
maximal recursive (MRR) SDS which is similar to the random serial dictatorship
but for which the lottery can be computed in polynomial time.
Brandl et al. [11] showed that the strict maximal lottery SDS satisfies SD-
efficiency and SD-participation; uniform randomization over Borda winners sat-
isfies strong SD -participation; and RSD (random serial dictatorship) satisfies
very strong SD-participation. The main open problem posed by Brandl et al.
[11] was whether there exists an SDS that satisfies very strong SD-participation
and SD-efficiency. Although random dictatorship (defined for strict preferences)
satisfies both properties, it is unclear whether an SDS satisfies both properties
when agents may express ties in their preferences. In more recent work, Brandl
et al. [12] study the connection between welfare maximization and participation.
3. Preliminaries
Consider the social choice setting in which there is a set of agents N =
{1, . . . , n}, a set of alternatives A = {a1, . . . , am} and a preference profile %=
(%1, . . . ,%n) such that each %i is a complete and transitive relation over A. Let
F (N) denote the set of all finite and non-empty subsets of N. We write a %i b
to denote that agent i values alternative a at least as much as alternative b and
use ≻i for the strict part of %i, i.e., a ≻i b iff a %i b but not b %i a. Finally,
∼i denotes i’s indifference relation, i.e., a ∼i b iff both a %i b and b %i a.
The relation %i results in equivalence classes E
1
i , E
2
i , . . . , E
ki
i for some ki such
that a ≻i a′ iff a ∈ Eli and a
′ ∈ El
′
i for some l < l
′. Often, we will use
these equivalence classes to represent the preference relation of an agent as a
preference list i : E1i , E
2
i , . . . , E
ki
i . For example, we will denote the preferences
a ∼i b ≻i c by the list i : {a, b}, {c}. For any set of alternative A′, we will refer
by max%i(A
′) the set of most preferred alternatives according to preference %i.
An agent i’s preferences are dichotomous iff he partitions the alternatives
into just two equivalence classes, i.e., ki = 2. An agent i’s preferences are strict
iff %i is antisymmetric, i.e. all equivalence classes have size 1.
Let ∆(A) denote the set of all lotteries (or probability distributions) over
A. The support of a lottery p ∈ ∆(A), denoted by supp(p), is the set of all
alternatives to which p assigns a positive probability, i.e., supp(p) = {x ∈ A |
p(x) > 0}. We will write p(a) for the probability of alternative a and we will
represent a lottery as p1a1 + · · · + pmam where pj = p(aj) for j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
For A′ ⊆ A, we will (slightly abusing notation) denote
∑
a∈A′ p(a) by p(A
′).
A social decision scheme is a function f : Rn → ∆(A). If f yields a set
rather than a single lottery, we call f a correspondence. Two minimal fairness
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conditions for SDSs are anonymity and neutrality. Informally, they require
that the SDS should not depend on the names of the agents or alternatives
respectively.
In order to reason about the outcomes of SDSs, we need to determine how
agents compare lotteries. A lottery extension extends preferences over alterna-
tives to (possibly incomplete) preferences over lotteries. Given %i over A, a
lottery extension E extends %i to %
E
i over the set of lotteries ∆(A). We now
define some particular lottery extensions that we will later refer to.
• Under stochastic dominance (SD), an agent prefers a lottery that, for each
alternative x ∈ A, has a higher probability of selecting an alternative that
is at least as good as x. Formally, p %SDi q iff ∀y ∈ A :
∑
x∈A:x%iy
p(x) ≥∑
x∈A:x%iy
q(x).
• In the downward lexicographic (DL) extension, an agent prefers the lottery
with higher probability for his most preferred equivalence class, in case of
equality, the one with higher probability for the second most preferred
equivalence class, and so on. Formally, p %DLi q iff for the smallest (if
any) l with p(Eli) 6= q(E
l
i) we have p(E
l
i) > q(E
l
i).
SD [9] is particularly important because p %SD q iff p yields at least as
much expected utility as q for any von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
consistent with the ordinal preferences [13].
We say a lottery extension E is a refinement of E ′ if
p %E
′
i q ⇐⇒ p ≻
E
i q.
We say a lottery extension E is complete if p %Ei q or q %
E
i p for all p, q ∈
∆(A) and %i. DL refines SD to a complete relation based on the natural
lexicographic relation over lotteries [20, 1, 13].
The following example illustrates a social choice setting where randomized
outcomes are compared by an agent with respect to the SD and DL relations.
Example 1. Consider the preference profile:
1 : a, b, c, d
2 : {a, b}, {c, d}
3 : {c, d}, {a, b}
Agent 1 most prefers a, then b, c, and d whereas agent 2 is indifferent between a
and b. Then 1
2
a+ 1
2
c is a possible randomized outcome in which the probability of
a and c is half each. Note that that 2
3
a+ 1
3
d 6%SD1
1
2
a+ 1
2
c but 2
3
a+ 1
3
d 6%DLi
1
2
a+ 1
2
c.
Efficiency and strategyproofness. Let E be any lottery extension. A lottery p
is E -efficient iff there exists no lottery q such that q %Ei p for all i ∈ N and
q ≻Ei p for some i ∈ N . An SDS is E -efficient iff it always returns an E -efficient
lottery. A standard efficiency notion that cannot be phrased in terms of lottery
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DL-efficiency
SD -efficiency
ex post efficiency
Figure 1: Relations between efficiency concepts.
extensions is ex post efficiency. A lottery is ex post efficient iff it is a lottery over
Pareto optimal alternatives. It is the case that DL-efficiency =⇒ SD -efficiency
=⇒ ex post efficiency.
An SDS f is E -manipulable iff there exists an agent i ∈ N and preference
profiles % and %′ with %j=%
′
j for all j 6= i such that f(%
′) ≻Ei f(%). An
SDS is weakly E -strategyproof iff it is not E -manipulable, it is E -strategyproof
iff f(%) %Ei f(%
′) for all % and %′ with %j=%
′
j for all j 6= i. Note that
SD-strategyproofness is equivalent to strategyproofness in the Gibbard sense.
It is known that SD-strategyproof =⇒ DL-strategyproof =⇒ weak SD-
strategyproof.
4. Participation
For any lottery extension E , we can define three notions of participation [11].
• Formally, an SDS f is E -manipulable (by strategic abstention) if there
exist %∈ %N for some N ∈ F (N) and i ∈ N such that f(%−i) ≻Ei f(%).
If an SDS is not E -manipulable it satisfies E -participation.
• An SDS f satisfies strong E -participation if f(%) %Ei f(%−i) for all N ∈
F (N), %∈ RN , and i ∈ N .
• An SDS f satisfies very strong E -participation if for all N ∈ F (N), %∈
RN , and i ∈ N , f(%) %Ei f(%−i) and
f(%) ≻Ei f(%−i) whenever ∃p ∈ ∆(A) : p ≻
E
i f(%−i).
Fact 1. For any lottery extension, very strong E -participation implies strong
E -participation which implies E -participation.
Next, we make further general observations about the relation between par-
ticipation notions.
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very strong SD-participation
very strong DL-participation
strong DL-participation
DL-participation
strong SD-participation
SD-participation
Figure 2: Relations between participation concepts.
Theorem 1. For any complete lottery extension, strong E -participation is
equivalent to E -participation.
Proof. If an SDS satisfies E -participation, then it cannot be that f(%−i) ≻Ei
f(%). Since E is complete, the statement is equivalent to saying that f(%) %Ei
f(%−i) which is equivalent to satisfying strong E -participation.
Theorem 2. For any complete lottery extension E that is a refinement of SD,
the following relations hold:
(i) Strong SD-participation implies Strong E -participation.
(ii) Very strong SD-participation implies very strong E -participation.
(iii) E -participation implies SD-participation.
Proof. Consider a complete lottery extension E that is a refinement of SD
(i) An SDS f satisfies strong SD-participation if f(%) %SDi f(%−i) which
implies that f(%) %Ei f(%−i) which is equivalent to f satisfying strong
E -participation.
(ii) If an SDS f satisfies very strong SD-participation, it satisfies strong SD-
participation which means it satisfies strong E -participation. Since f
satisfies very strong SD-participation, f(%) ≻SDi f(%−i) whenever ∃p ∈
∆(A) : p ≻Ei f(%−i). Since E is a refinement of SD , it implies that f(%
) ≻Ei f(%−i) whenever ∃p ∈ ∆(A) : p ≻
E
i f(%−i).
(iii) Assume f does not satisfy SD-participation. Then f(%−i) ≻SDi f(%) for
some profile %. This implies that f(%−i) ≻
E
i f(%) which means that f
does not satisfy E -participation.
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Corollary 1. The following relations hold:
(i) Strong SD-participation implies Strong DL-participation.
(ii) Very strong SD-participation implies very strong DL-participation.
(iii) DL-participation implies SD-participation.
The following statement also follows directly from the definitions.
Theorem 3. For any complete lottery extension E that is a refinement of SD,
the combination of strong SD-participation and very strong E -participation im-
plies very strong SD-participation.
Proof. An SDS f satisfies very strong E -participation if for all N ∈ F (N),
%∈ RN , and i ∈ N , f(%) %Ei f(%−i) and
f(%) ≻Ei f(%−i) whenever ∃p ∈ ∆(A) : p ≻
E
i f(%−i).
Assume that f(%−i) is such that ∃p ∈ ∆(A) : p ≻Ei f(%−i) Now assume that
f satisfies very strong E -participation and strong SD-participation but not very
strong SD-participation. But this means that f(%) ≻Ei f(%−i) and f(%) %
SD
i
f(%−i). Since f(%) ≻Ei f(%−i), we know that f(%) 6∼
SD
i f(%−i). Hence f(%
) ≻SDi f(%−i) which means that f satisfies very strong SD-participation.
5. Social Decision Schemes
In this paper, we formally prove participation properties of classic as well as
recently introduced SDSs. Before we do that, we give an overview of the SDSs.
5.1. Serial Dictatorship and Random Serial Dictatorship
The serial dictatorship rule is defined with respect to a permutation π over
N . It starts with the set of all alternatives and then each agent in π successively
refines the set of alternatives to the set of most preferred alternatives from the
remaining set. RSD returns the serial dictatorship outcome with respect to a
permutation that is chosen uniformly at random.
5.2. Egalitarian Simultaneous Reservation
The egalitarian simultaneous reservation (ESR) rule is based on the idea
of gradually refining the set of lotteries. We present verbatim the informal
description of ESR as presented by Aziz and Stursberg [7]:
Starting from the entire set ∆(A), the ESR algorithm proceeds by grad-
ually restricting the set of possible outcomes. The restrictions enforced are
lower bounds for the probability of certain equivalence classes while it is al-
ways maintained that a lottery exists that satisfies all these lower bounds. Each
equivalence class E is represented by a tower where at any time t, the height of
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this tower’s ceiling ℓt(E) represents the lower bound in place for the probability
of this subset at that time. During the algorithm, agents will climb up these
towers and try to push up the ceilings, thereby increasing the lower bounds for
certain subsets. Each tower starts with the height of its ceiling set to 0. Ev-
ery agent starts climbing up the tower that corresponds to his most preferred
equivalence class. Whenever an agent hits the ceiling, he tries to push it up.
He continues climbing, pushing up the ceiling at the same time. Note that the
ceiling will only be pushed up as fast as the agent pushing it can climb. Two
agents pushing up a ceiling at the same time therefore does not increase the
speed of it being pushed up. When it cannot be pushed up any further without
compromising the existence of a lottery satisfying all current lower bounds, we
say that set E is tight and has been frozen. At this point, the agent bounces off
the ceiling and drops back to the floor, moving on to the tower corresponding
to his next most preferred equivalence class. We can think of the algorithm
proceeding in stages where a stage ends whenever some agent bounces off the
ceiling. The algorithm ends when all the equivalence classes have been frozen
at which point some lottery satisfying the lower bounds is returned.
5.3. Maximal Recursive Rule
We now describe the MR (Maximal Recursive) rule as presented by Aziz [2].
We will denote by s1(a, S,%) the generalized plurality score of a according to %
when the alternative set and the preference profile is restricted to S.
s1(a, S,%) = |{i ∈ N : a ∈ max
%i
(S)}|.
MRR relies on the concept of IMS (inclusion minimal subsets). For S ⊆ A,
let A1, . . . , Am′ be subsets of S. Let I(A1, . . . , Am′) be the set of non-empty
intersections of elements of some subset of {A1, . . . , Am′}.
I(A1, . . . , Am′)
={X ∈ 2A \ ∅ :X =
⋂
Aj∈A′
Aj for some A
′ ⊆ {A1, . . . , Am′}}.
Then, the inclusion minimal subsets of S ⊆ A with respect to (A1, . . . , Am′)
are defined as follows.
IMS(A1, . . . , Am′)
={X ∈ I(A1, . . . , Am′) : ∄X
′ ∈ I(A1, . . . , Am′)
s.t. X ′ ⊂ X}.
MRR is defined as Algorithm 1 that requires as a subroutine Algorithm 2
that involves calls on subsets of the alternatives.
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Input: (A,N,%)
Call MRR-subroutine(A, 1, (A,N,%)) to compute p(a) for each a ∈ A.
return [a1 : p(a1), . . . , am : p(am)]
Algorithm 1: MRR
Input: (S, v, (A,N,%))
1 if max%i(S) = S for all i ∈ N then
2 p(a) = v/|S| for all a ∈ S
3 else
4 T (i, S,%)←− {a : a ∈ argmaxa∈max%i (S)
s1(a, S,%)} for all i ∈ N
5 t(i, a,%) ←− 1/|T (i, S,%)| if a ∈ T (i, S,%) & zero otherwise for all i ∈ N &
a ∈ S
6 γ(a)←−
∑
i∈N
t(i, a,%) for all a ∈ S
7 p(a)←− v(γ(a,%))/|N | for all a ∈ S
8 {S1, . . . , Sk} ←− IMS(max%1(S), . . . ,max%n(S))
9 for each Sj ∈ {S1, . . . , Sk} do
10 return MRR-subroutine(Sj , p(Sj), (A,N,%))
Algorithm 2: MRR-subroutine
6. Participation Incentives in Social Decision Schemes
Note that RSD satisfies very strong SD-participation [11] which implies both
strong SD-participation as well as very strong DL-participation. However RSD
takes exponential time. We first observe that there is a simple rule that satisfies
strong SD-participation.
Remark 1. The constant rule that gives the same probability to each alternative
satisfies strong SD-participation.
Since the constant rule is highly inefficient for any reasonable notion of effi-
ciency, the remark shows that satisfying strong SD-participation only becomes
challenging when the goal is to additionally satisfy properties like ex post effi-
ciency or SD-efficiency.
We first observe that BO does not satisfy very strong DL-participation. The
reason is that an agent voting may not change the set of Borda winners which
means that the resultant lottery does not change as well.
Next, we show that there is a simple linear-time rule that achieves very
strong DL-strategyproofness. Consider the following rule which we refer to
as PP (Proportional Plurality). Each agent has a total of 1 point which he
uniformly distribute among the alternatives in his first equivalence class. Each
alternative then gets probability that is equal the total amount of points that
it gets divided by n.
Theorem 4. PP satisfies very strong DL-participation.
Proof. Let us compare PP (%−i) with PP (%). In PP (%), the points of all
alternative not in maxi(A) stay the same whereas the points of alternatives
10
{a,b,c,d,e}
{a (5/18), b (5/18)}
{a (10/18)}
{c (8/18)}
Depth 0
Depth 1
Depth 2
1 : {a, b, c, d}, {e} 2 : {a, b}, {c, d}, {e}
3 : {c, e}, {a}, {d}, {b}
Figure 3: Recursion tree corresponding to running MRR on the preference profile above. The
lottery returned is [a : 10/18, b : 0, c : 8/18] when all agents vote. The outcome is [c : 1] when
2 does not vote. Hence agent 2 gets an SD more preferred outcome when he participates.
in maxi(A) increase because of the extra points allocated due to the presence
of agent i. Hence the probability weight of agent i’s first equivalence class is
strictly more in PP (%) in contrast to PP (%−i).
In PP , we have a natural rule that is anonymous, neutral and satisfies very
strong DL-participation. Note however that PP is not ex post efficient. This
raises the question whether there is any SDS that satisfies ex post efficiency as
well as DL-participation. Next, we show that the Maximal Recursive (MR) that
is known to be ex post efficient [2] also satisfies very strong DL-participation.
Note that RSD satisfies very strong SD-participation [11] which implies
SD-participation. However, it does not satisfy SD-efficiency [6] and it takes
exponential time.
Theorem 5. MR satisfies very strong SD-participation.
Proof. We first prove that by participating, an agent increases the probability
of his first equivalence class if it is not already one. Let us compare MR(%−i)
with MR(%). In MR(%), the points of all alternative not in maxi(A) stay
the same whereas the points of alternatives in maxi(A) increase because of the
extra points allocated due to the presence of agent i. Hence the probability
weight of agent i’s first equivalence class is strictly more in MR(%) in contrast
to MR(%−i).
We now show that MR satisfies strong SD-participation. In view of the
our first claim, it will follow that MR satisfies very strong SD-participation.
We first note that when i votes, he always contributes his score to alternatives
in a set S to max%i(S). When i votes, other agents may also contribute to
alternatives in max%i(S) if they are their most preferred alternatives as well.
Let us consider the recursion tree T−i of MR when i does not vote. Any
given node denote by S corresponds to the set of alternatives S in the recursion
tree when i does not vote, for which a total probability weight v needs to
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be distributed among the children of the node that corresponds to inclusion
minimal subsets of S with respect to (max%1(S), . . . ,max%n(S)).
Let us compare T−i with the recursion tree T of MR when i does vote. Let
S be the node nearest to the root in T−i that has a different weight distribution
among its children than in T . Let us compare the children nodes and their
probability with the case when i does vote and the children nodes are S′
1
, S′
2
. . ..
We show that when i votes, in S, any reallocation of probability weight is to
i’s most preferred alternatives in S which is consistent with an SD-improving
probability transfer for i.
When agents give points to the different alternatives in S, then each alter-
native in S \max%i(S) get at most the same number of points as when i does
not vote. As for alternative in max%i(S), at least one of them gets strictly more
points than before. Therefore when we look at the inclusion minimal subsets in
T and T−i, any decrease in the probability weight of some Sj ∈ S \max%i(S)
corresponds to an increase in the probability weight of some Sℓ ⊂ S∩max%i(S).
There is a shift in probability weight of the child nodes and each shift in
probability weight of the child nodes corresponds to an increase in the proba-
bility weight of inclusion minimal subsets that are subsets of max%i(S) which
implies an SD-improvement. The same argument can be applied inductively
down the tree which proves that MR satisfies strong SD-participation.
In the shape ofMR, we have an anonymous, neutral, weak SD-strategyproof,
and ex post efficient SDS that satisfies very strong SD-participation. However,
MR is not SD -efficient. Next, we consider an SD -efficient rule (ESR) already
in the literature [7] and show that it satisfies strong SD-participation.
ESR does not satisfy very strong SD-participation.
Theorem 6. ESR does not satisfy very strong SD-participation.
Proof. Consider the profile:
1 : a, b 2 : a, b 3 : b, a 4 : b, a
Then ESR(%−4) =
1
2
a+ 1
2
b and ESR(%) = 1
2
a+ 1
2
b as well.
In fact, we next show that ESR does not even satisfy strong SD-
participation.
Theorem 7. ESR does not satisfy strong SD-participation
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Proof. Consider the following preference profile.1
1 :{b, c, f}, {a, d, e, g, h}
2 :{a, h}, {c, d, e, f, g}, {b}
3 :{b, c, d, e, h}, {a, f, g}
4 :{a, d}, {b, c, g}, {e}, {f, h}
5 :{a, d, e, f, h}, {b, g}, {c}
6 :{e, h}, {a, c, f}, {b, d, g}
The ESR outcome is following lottery:
a : 0.333333, b : 0.166667, c : 0.166667, d : 0.000000, e : 0.000000, f :
0.000000, g : 0.000000, h : 0.333333.
The ESR outcome when 2 abstains is a : 0.222222, b : 0.111111, c :
0.222222, d : 0.111111, e : 0.333333, f : 0.000000, g : 0.000000, h : 0.000000.
Note that probability of b is 1/6 in the original lottery but 1/9 when 2
abstains. Therefore when 2 votes, the outcomes does not SD-dominate the
outcome when 2 abstains.
Remark 2. For a complete refinement E of SD, if a rule is E -efficient, it does
not imply that it satisfies very strong E -participation. For example, ESR is
DL-efficient but does not satisfy very strong DL-participation.
Brandl et al. [11] proved that RSD satisfies very strong SD-participation.
On the other hand, serial dictatorship that is an SD-strategyproof and DL-
efficient rule does not even satisfy very strong DL-participation or very strong
SD-participation.
Theorem 8. Serial dictatorship does not satisfy very strong DL-participation
or very strong SD-participation.
Proof. Consider the following preference profile.
1 : {a, b}, c
2 : c, b, a
3 : c, b, a
Consider serial dictatorship with respect to permutation 123. Then, the outcome
for profile (%1,%2) is 1b. The outcome remains the same for profile (%1,%2,%3
).
The theorem above leads to the following observations.
Remark 3. If a rule satisfies DL-strategyproofness, it does not imply that it
satisfies very strong DL-participation. Serial dictatorship is DL-strategyproof
and in fact even SD-strategyproof. However, we have shown that it does not
satisfy very strong DL-participation.
1The example was identified by Pang Luo using https://www-m9.ma.tum.de/games/sr-applet/index_en.html .
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Remark 4. If a rule satisfies DL-efficiency and hence SD-efficiency, it does
not imply that it satisfies very strong DL-participation or very strong SD-
participation. For example, serial dictatorship satisfies the efficiency properties
but not the participation properties.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we continued the line of research concerning strategic aspects
in randomized social choice [2, 3, 6, 11]. In particular, we expanded the taxon-
omy of participation notions by relating participation with respect to stochastic
dominance and participation with respect to refinements of stochastic domi-
nance. We also proved MRR satisfies very strong-participation but ESR does
not satisfy strong SD-participation. Other than identifying attractive SDSs
with good efficiency and participation properties, our study further clarifies the
the extent to which efficiency, polynomial-time computability, and participation
are compatible.
Brandl et al. [11] posed an interesting open problem whether there exists a
social decision scheme that satisfies SD -efficiency and very strong SD-efficiency.
We conclude with a similar open problem: does there exist an SDS that satisfies
DL-efficiency and very strong DL-participation?
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